For almost half a century the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were guided by the communist ideology, a centralised planned economy and a totalitarian political regime. People of the former Soviet Union lived under these circumstances for the most part of the twentieth century. All these circumstances have made a deep imprint on the historic memory of the peoples and left many traces on their way of life, their psychology, their culture and economy - traces that are not likely soon to be wiped out of their hearts and their minds. Countries of the communist world have got a lot in common due to their common history, their common past.

This history also determined a number of similar difficulties and problems which the peoples of these countries had to face after the disintegration of the communist system. Among these problems there are economic decay, reduction of the level of life-expectancy, political instability, a spiritual-ideological crisis and fragmentation of everyday values. Some of these difficulties have already been largely overcome in the countries of Central Europe: inflation has come down, there has been economic growth; the countries are run by governments that have been elected on the basis of legal democratic procedures; human rights are safeguarded. In other countries, mostly in the republics of the former USSR and also in some countries of Southern Europe, the changes are taking place at a much slower pace and with many more difficulties.

The humanist movement developing in these countries has some common features and some specific national peculiarities. I would like to dwell more thoroughly on those problems which influence the 'humanistic atmosphere' in these countries and have a negative influence too. We should bear in mind that the humanist movement means not only the union of people who have a naturalistic world outlook and share secular moral values. It is also the union of active, energetic people who are united by the rejection of existing social rules, institutions, organisations and ideological systems prone to humiliate a human being politically, economically and morally, conducive to suppress his or her individuality. Humanists in all countries, to put it in simple words, have got adversaries they are fiercely fighting.

THE third eternal adversary the humanist movement is bound to face is clericalism and obscurantism. The crisis of the communist ideology, which was the main reason for the disintegration of the communist system and which put an end to the Marxist-Leninist ideological monopoly and the official atheism, eliminated external restraints for the activity of religious organisations to begin with, and also turned out to be an important prerequisite for the stimulation of this activity causing a deep spiritual and intellectual crisis.

Traditional beliefs were the first to put this situation to their advantage, public opinion being rather favourable to them. Relying on their reputation as undesecrated springs of spirituality these churches enjoyed a dramatic increase in the number of devotees (in the CIS countries 2.5 times) and spread their influence beyond the boundaries of their religious communities. Priests went to schools, hospitals, prisons, army corps to help those in need. Little time passed before monasterial orders were installed in many of those places.

Politics and religion began to draw closer together: politicians went to churches; priests became involved in politics. When in 1991 TV showed the world for the first time political leaders of the young Russian democracy (those who not long ago had prominent positions in the communist hierarchy) participating in a religious ceremony, candles in their hands, it caused quite a stir in the mass media. By now we have got used to this picture. Nobody is surprised any longer at the flirtation of Russian communists with our churches. Rapprochement of the church with the state is now taken for granted, and this rapprochement means quite sufficient material benefits to the church. This means, first, licenses and privileges for the 'holy business' of the church. But at the same time there are many examples when buildings and other things of national cultural value are withdrawn from museums and put under the auspices of parishes, though the ability of these parishes to preserve these national treasures for the use of both believers and non-believers seems doubtful and their future causes great concern.

The reconstruction of the cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow is a vivid example of this dubious co-operation between the church and state. The cathedral, built a century ago with money donated by the people, was barbarously destroyed by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were first planning to erect a gigantic Palace of Soviets on this site, though later a swimming pool was built and became very popular with Muscovites who came here to relax. The Moscow mayor, Yuri Lujhkov, one of the bosom friends of our church, reconstructed the Cathedral on the site where the swimming pool was. It took him less than two years and evidently an impressive sum of money from the capital's budget, the cathedral having become one of the most prominent architectural buildings in Moscow.

The rapprochement between the church and state seems to be a general trend in post-communist countries...

There are considerable advantages from and reasons for the state's rapprochement with the church. Firstly, our statesmen, many of whom in their very recent past were party functionaries (according to a recent sociological survey their number is close to 50 per cent in Russia, in the CIS countries the picture must be very close) have a kind of guilty feeling remembering their predecessors and their anti-religious excesses, which they are trying to atone for, but at the expense of the taxpayer. Secondly, the state considers it necessary to tune in to the current spiritual atmosphere which is favourable at the moment, as far as the church is concerned. Third, the state expects certain political advantage from the union with this mighty and authoritative organisation can bring - for instance, increasing electoral support with the help of believers. And last but not least, the state hopes that the church and religion would unite the nation as it used to do in the pre-comnmunist era.

I dare say all these expectations are wrong. Though supported by the church the faithful Catholic Valeda didn't win in Poland. In Russia, both Yeltsin and communist candidate Zyuganov made uncountable bows to the church and religion, but Yeltsin won and Zyuganov lost. Politicians and clericals misunderstand people's feeling and aspirations towards religion and church: recent sociological research in Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine have shown that more than 50 per cent of the population do not approve the demonstrative participation of statesmen in religious ceremonies, 57 per cent oppose the involvement of the priests in politics, and only 20 per cent stand for the establishment of clerical parties. The policy pursued by the Russian government in relation to the church is quite short-sighted, Russia being the most multi-belief country in the whole post-communist world. The exclusive support of the Orthodox Church in the country where more than 25 per cent of believers are neither Orthodox, nor Christian, can hardly be considered sensible. And one can consider it an ultimate folly when a few years ago the Russian government elevated Orthodox Christmas to the status of a national holiday.

Close ties between the church and the state mean not only advantages for the church. In Chechnia, separatists arrested Orthodox priests considering them to be spies. In the Ukraine and in Estonia the state interfered with internal conflict within the church, supporting one of the parties involved. The reason is that the other party is considered to be 'the hand of Moscow' as it expressed itself in support of its submission to the Patriarchy of Moscow. For the same reason Catholic missionaries from Poland are doomed to failure in Moscow.

We can see a different picture as far as other confessions are concerned - the so-called 'non-state'. During the years of the Communist regime the state banned any of their activities with the rare exception of a few Protestant confessions (Lutheran, Evangelicals) and also Islam, Buddhism, Judaism in the places where they were historically influential. In the post-communist period, in the countries of the CIS, the state stopped controlling activities of religious organisations subjecting them only to occasional, inconsistent and quite often unconstitutional restraints when the latter were demanded for by the 'state church' worried by mounting competition.

The results appeared pretty soon. From all over the world thousands of preachers rushed to fill this spiritual void, which emerged on the post-communist territory. It was their Klondike and missionaries from the USA, Korea, Japan and Nigeria are exploring it vigorously. The weapons they use to gain followers is not the force of their sermon or persuasiveness of the truth they propagate, but big money which they use to buy the mass media, to publish free propagandist literature, to establish the houses of worship. Due to their big financial resources foreign missionaries became dangerous rivals of secular culture. The preponderance of religious programmes on radio and TV prepaid by preachers is an unpleasant fact, while educational and popular scientific programmes become a rarity because of the lack of money, but fortunately, in spite of all their efforts, these spiritual conquistadors can't boast big success yet: the size of their followers in the CIS countries do not exceed 1 per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, they are not discouraged and painstakingly lay the foundation for possible future power by leaning on financial sources from abroad.

As is widely recognised, the growth of obscurantism has become the characteristic feature of the spiritual and intellectual atmosphere in post-Communist countries. The considerable demand for fortune-tellers, sorcerers, magical healers, psychics, etc., is a sign of this, together with a wide assortment of literature on mysticism and the paranormal that covers the shelves in the book-stores, while there is a simultaneous disappearance of humanistic-scientific literature.

The symbolic expression of irrationalism of social consciousness in Russia was the replacement of the weather forecast by an astrological forecast in the most popular TV information programmes 'Time' in the early nineties. At the beginning of the 9Os, sociologists reported the strong decrease of the amount of unbelievers in society (3 times) and the emergence of specific group of the 'superstitious; (6 per cent of the population) that is believers in supernatural forces.

Summing up, we can recognise that the humanist organisations in the post-Soviet countries have a gigantic field for their activities. However, the humanist movement faces considerable difficulties.

1. The impoverishment of the people, the decrease of the middle class, the concern for one's daily bread reduce the concern about culture.

2. The indifference to the fate of the secular culture of the plutocratic state, because an egotistical and short-sighted oligarchy in power cannot derive the short-term benefits from it.

3. The spread of ideology and values in society that emphasise above all profit and commercial success also makes an unfavourable atmosphere for the development of secular culture.

Finally, I will draw attention to optimistic factors that are favourable for the humanist movement:

1. The population of the post-Soviet countries is well-educated and brought up in traditions of secular culture and the naturalistic world-view, especially the older generation.

2. The societies of these countries have accumulated a big potential of irritation and resentment at clericalism and obscurantism.

3. The self-discrediting of the church and religion is in progress and will lead to new disillusionment.

Now we can notice changes for the better. Common sense is emerging in the social consciousness. A big list of tasks for the humanist movement flow from here, and among the most urgent -- the elaboration of a systematic humanist ideology.