It is a well-known fact: Many people live in abject socio-economic misery, exploited, slaving in horrible working conditions, without enough food, housing, health care and education. In this globalised world they are very near to us. We are only a few hours’ travelling away from the street child in Bolivia, from the raped woman in Darfur, from the HIV infected man in South Africa, from the homeless in New York, from the powerless untouchables in Asia, from the victims of the earthquake in China, or of hurricanes like Katharina or Nargis.

How is this widely known and nearby human misery possible despite the socio-economic human rights, like the right to adequate housing, to food, to health care, education, mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents? Why is there hardly any mentioning of socio-economic rights in the context of the Millennium Development Goals, although they are about the same subjects? Why allows the international community readily this violation of socio-economic rights to continue, while the violation of civil and political rights, like the right to freedom of belief and freedom of expression raises enormous indignation and abhorrence? Why do I have the impression that also many humanists care more about civil and political rights than about socio-economic tights? In short, why are socio-economic rights treated as second-rate rights although the UDHR itself says that socio-economic rights are indispensible for human dignity?

I think one of the reasons is that a spirit of libertarianism has pervaded the ideas and policies of many people, countries and international organisations, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Even if they do not call themselves libertarian they seem to be infected by libertarianism. Libertarianism sees freedom as the most important value. We, humanists also attach much value to freedom. However, I think we should be cautious not to interpret our humanism as libertarianism. Because closer examination of libertarianism reveals that it suffers from illusions. I will deal with some of these illusions now.

Libertarians are fond of civil and political rights. After all, these rights protect and promote freedom, because they require others, in particular the government to refrain from interfering with people’s lives, with their belief, their expressions. They prescribe others to stay out of people’s private domain. Socio-economic rights, however, cannot count on much sympathy from the libertarians. Libertarians even are opposed to these rights. Socio-economic rights do not promote and protect freedom. They do not require others to refrain from doing something, on the contrary they imply a duty for others, in particular governments, to actually doing something, for instance to provide people with adequate health care or food. Even worse, these rights are in conflict with the right to freedom and the right to property. In order to implement these rights, the well-off are forced to pay taxes as a contribution to the improvement of the position of the least-advantaged. That amounts to a violation of the law-full property of the well-off, so it is said by libertarians.

But, so I would like to ask hem, can we be sure that the well-off are the legitimate owners of their property? Is their property that sacrosanct that demanding them to give up part of it, is beyond consideration? Nozick, a famous libertarian, argues that people are entitled to the goods they posses, if the history of these goods is legitimate, i.e. if the first acquisition in the distant past and the subsequent transfers have been legitimate, i.e. have taken place on a voluntary base, and, if –when they have not been transferred legitimately- measures have been taken to correct the injustice of the transfer.

Well, if that is the procedure that makes property legitimate I tend to say that most property will be illegitimate, as often property will have been and is acquired through force and manipulation. Somewhere in the history of possessions something will have gone wrong. Are not the well-off -are not many of us- the heirs of robber knights, colonizers, plunderers? Nozick does not deny that, but it does not disquiet him. He says that possible iniquities and injustices in the history of goods are corrected or compensated for by the healing effects of the capitalist system. Capitalism, the free-market, has ensured that the position of the poor of today is much better that the position of the poor in the past. That makes the current distribution of property legitimate and inviolable.
But, that is a hasty conclusion. That is an illusion.

The point is not whether the position of the poor of today is better than that of their fellow-sufferers of the past, the question is whether the poor wouldn’t have been and wouldn’t be better-off under a system different from the capitalist system, for instance under a system that respects and implement socio-economic rights. I think they would have been and would be better off. That unmasks the healing pretensions of capitalism. And, that implies that the property of the well-off is not that sacred that they should not be forced to contribute to the implementation of socio-economic rights by giving up a small part of their wealth to alleviate the misery of the poor.

Nozick’s fellow libertarian Hayek does not say that the current distribution is just, but he argues that socio-economic situations cannot be called just, neither can they be called unjust. Justice and injustice are notions that presuppose human involvement and socio-economic situations, like poverty are not the result of human actions. Poverty may be hard but it cannot be called unjust, like also it cannot be called unjust when people fall victim to a hurricane.

I would say, also this is a hasty conclusion, it is an illusion.

Socio-economic situations do not appear out of the blue. They are the sediment of conflicts between people about wealth and resources. Conflicts may sometimes remain below the surface, but they exist in every society and in global relationships. And, poverty is the result of these conflicting struggles for life. The vulnerable and the weak are pushed aside by the powerful, sometimes and in some societies by violence, but often and in most societies through socio-economic measures, import-duties, trade-policies.

It must be admitted, often socio-economic misery has not been caused by intentional actions. By buying products produced by child labour, I do not intend to cause misery but perhaps I do. By putting my money in the bank that invests it in a company that has factories where workers work in horrible working-conditions I do not intend to cause misery, but may be I do. Am I then responsible for the misery I cause?

Are we responsible for the unintended result of our actions? To some extent we are. Someone who causes a traffic accident without being at fault but who does not care about the victim, commits an act of injustice. Likewise people may be said to have committed an act of injustice if they cause socio-economic misery and they refuse to take steps to alleviate the suffering they have caused. Supporting socio-economic rights is a means to discharge one’s responsibility and to take steps to alleviate the suffering one unintentionally may have caused.

Libertarians attach value to freedom, but they interpret freedom as freedom from interference by others, in particular the government, and they see civil and political rights as a way to realize this freedom. And they think no more needs to be said about freedom. But, thinking that freedom is “freedom from interference, period”, is a hasty conclusion, it is an illusion.

At least three objections can be made.

1. Freedom from interference is important, but, so one may ask, what is the worth of that freedom if people do not have shelter against cold and rain, if they don’t have access to education, if they starve to death? If their civil and political rights are respected one may jubilantly say that these people are free, but that is a hasty conclusion, it is an illusion. One cannot but admit that the worth of this freedom is rather small. To make their freedom worthy or to enhance the worth of their freedom not only civil and political rights but also their socio-economic rights should be respected.

2. And, we can bring up another argument against the statement that “freedom is freedom from interference, period”. Let us try to find out why freedom from interference is important. Why is it important that others mind their own business? Libertarians themselves say that freedom from interference is important because we can achieve our goals and realize our values, that we can have at our disposal our talents and the fruits of our talents. If people are free from interference they can follow their dreams and aspirations. In short freedom from interference enables people to live their lives as they think fit.
I agree with libertarians, being free to live your life as you think fit, being free to determine the course of your life, that is the freedom everything turns on. That is also the freedom that we humanists adhere to. But, thinking, like libertarians do, that freedom from interference guarantees this substantial freedom, is a hasty conclusion, it is an illusion. For, sometimes people are free to that extent that nobody is interfering with their lives, but, due to miserable socio-economic circumstances they are not free to live their lives as they think fit.

It looks like we have three freedoms: firstly, substantial freedom, to be free to live their lives as people think fit, that is the top-freedom; then the freedom from interference, the absence of coercing others, which can be called negative freedom; thirdly, positive freedom, the presence of enabling circumstances. To enjoy substantial freedom, i.e. to be able to live their lives as they think fit, people not only need negative freedom, but also positive freedom. Negative freedom is served by civil and political rights, positive freedom, by socio-economic rights.

3. One could also agree with libertarians that freedom is freedom from interference, period! But, so one could continue, thinking that only civil and political rights are needed to protect and promote that freedom from interference, is a hasty conclusion, it is an illusion. True, civil and political rights protect and promote freedom from interference by saying that people may not be prevented from expressing their opinion or practising their belief. But, socio-economic rights also promote and protect negative freedom. They do that by saying that people may not be prevented from providing themselves with necessary resources. The powerful, so this argument runs, deprive the poor of food, housing, health care. They do that, not with their bare hands but by oppressive political arrangements. For instance, there is said to be a global food crisis. But, are you, are we, in want of food? Is there a shortage of food, or is most food taken by the well-off, leaving the rest to the poor? Socio-economic rights say that the well-off may not take all the resources and leave only some crumbs to the weak. In this way socio-economic rights are interpreted as protecting freedom from interference.

Whether one sees socio-economic rights as rights that protect the worth of liberty, as rights that protect positive freedom, i.e. the presence of enabling circumstances, or as rights that protect negative freedom by prescribing the powerful not to deprive the poor of access to socio-economic goods, they are aimed at freedom, just like the civil and political rights.

We, humanists, regard freedom as indispensable for a dignified life. We then should be concerned about the right to freedom of belief, the right to freedom of expression and other civil and political rights, but we should also be concerned about socio-economic rights. After all, human dignity is at stake.

Rob Buitenweg is Associate Professor of Human Rights at the Kosmopolis Institute, The Netherlands. VP of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, he is a member of the Board of Governors of the International Jurists Organization and Board member of the Dutch Humanist Committee of Human Rights. He was lecturer in the philosophy of law at the University for Humanistics in 1989. He has published widely in both English and Dutch.