In August 1990, the 56 member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) adopted The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam [1]. In this document all rights are seen as derived from God, and Article 24 states that: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah”. The preamble states that “no one as a matter of principle has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments”.

At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Iran, supported by several other Islamic states, pressed for the acceptance of the Cairo Declaration as an alternative to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR). They partly achieved their objective in 1997 when, without discussion or debate in the General Assembly, the Cairo Declaration was included by the UN in A Compilation of International Instruments issued by High Commission for Human Rights.

Not an alternative?

Fast forward to Human Rights Day, 10 December 2007. Ambassador Masood Khan, addressing the Human Rights Council on behalf of the Islamic States, spoke glowingly of the Universal Declaration, noting the contribution to its creation made by many Muslim countries. But he then went on to claim that the Cairo Declaration “is not an alternative, competing worldview on human rights. It complements the Universal Declaration as it addresses religious and cultural specificity of the Muslim countries”.

Not an alternative? Even a cursory reading of the Cairo Declaration shows just how widely its definition of human rights differs from those of the UDHR. No “complementary” document (the word implies adding to, not subtracting from) should restrict the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration. Yet this is precisely what the Cairo Declaration does. Under Shari’a law a woman has no personal autonomy. A women’s word or the word of a non-Muslim counts as half that of a Muslim man; and they are valued as half that of a Muslim man. No woman is considered an autonomous individual but needs a guardian–her father, husband, son or another male relative– and may not make autonomous decisions. Freedom of religion is limited to freedom to become and remain a Muslim. Apostasy and any actions or statements considered blasphemous are harshly punished, in some states by death.

Ann Elizabeth Meyer in her classic analysis of Islam and human rights2 describes the declaration as not so much a statement of human rights as a statement of man’s responsibilities towards God. According to Meyer (p66):

“International law does not accept that fundamental human rights may be restricted – much less permanently curtailed – by reference to the requirements of any particular religion. International law does not provide any warrant for depriving Muslims of human rights by according primacy to Islamic criteria.”

In the same speech to the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Khan said that “The OIC was considering the establishment of an independent permanent body to promote human rights in accordance with the provisions of the Cairo Declaration”, and he referred to a decision taken by the May 2007 Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers to work on an Islamic Charter of Human Rights, a Convention of Women’s Rights in Islam and an Islamic Covenant against Racial Discrimination. Not an alternative? Then why propose them?

Our attempted rebuttal

It was disappointing that no delegation was prepared to challenge the absurdity of Pakistan’s claim. IHEU in collaboration with one other NGO attempted to do so in the interactive dialogue the following day but our intervention was ruled “out of order” and our text stricken from the record.

Unwilling to let the matter rest, we joined the World Union for Progressive Judaism in writing to Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, requesting a legal ruling as to whether the proposed charter based on The Cairo Declaration would conflict with the Universal Declaration.

The elimination of discrimination based on religion or belief

In September 2007 the European Union had attempted to introduce a resolution in the Human Rights Council on the elimination of discrimination based on religion or belief, but its introduction was deferred until December in an attempt by the sponsors to obtain the support of the OIC. Despite quite intensive negotiations, however, it became clear that no agreement would be possible. On December 14, the Pakistani delegate, again speaking for the OIC, said that differences remained on five important issues, inter alia: respect for all religions and beliefs, and respect for national laws and religious norms about the right to change one’s religion. “Hence, we dissociate ourselves from operative paragraph 9(a) because of its phrase ‘including the right to change one’s religion or belief’”. Yet this right is clearly enshrined in Article 18 of the UDHR to which all but one of the Islamic states are signatories.

In the event none of the states objecting to the resolution actually voted against it – thereby maintaining the myth of their support for universal human rights. What they did do however was abstain, safe in the knowledge that in order to be adopted any resolution requires a majority of member states to vote in favour, and their abstentions were therefore equivalent to votes against the resolution. Despite this opposition the resolution was carried by 29 votes to 0, with 18 abstentions.

Defamation of Religion

On 18 December 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution “Combating Defamation of Religions” by 108 votes to 51 with 25 abstentions. Similar resolutions have been adopted for the past seven years by the old Commission for Human Rights and by the new Council. This is the first time, however, that such a resolution had been passed by the General Assembly. The resolution expresses “deep concern about the negative stereotyping of religions and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief”. But the only religion mentioned by name is Islam. The resolution also notes with deep concern, “the intensification of the campaign to defame religions and the ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim minorities in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001”. It emphasises that whilst everyone has the right to freedom of expression, this should be exercised with responsibility – and may therefore be subject to limitations, inter alia “for respect for religions and beliefs”.

The Western delegations stood firm, however, in their opposition to this resolution. The Portuguese delegate, speaking for the EU, explained clearly why:

“The European Union does not see the concept of ‘defamation of religions’ as a valid one in a human rights discourse. From a human rights perspective, members of religious or belief communities should not be viewed as parts of homogenous entities. International human rights law protects primarily individuals in the exercise of their freedom of religion or belief, rather than the religions as such.”

Notwithstanding these objections, those opposing the resolution found themselves on the losing side of a two-to-one majority in favour. The implications of this resolution for freedom to criticise religious laws and practices are obvious. Armed with UN approval for their actions, states may now legislate against any show of disrespect for religion, however they may choose to define “disrespect”.

The Islamic states see human rights exclusively in Islamic terms, and by sheer weight of numbers this view is becoming dominant within the UN system. The implications for the universality of human rights are ominous.

2. Ann Elizabeth Mayer: Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, (fourth edition), Westview Press 2007

Roy Brown is IHEU representative at UN, Geneva, and former President of IHEU.