Rob Buitenweg

There is a crisis in human rights.

At first sight this would seem to be an unsustainable statement. After all, the second half of the last century saw the emergence and development of international human rights, which were intended to be instruments against the humiliation and violation of human dignity (McKay 1979: 67; Abu Zayd 1998b: par.1). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 1948. It appeared to be a landmark in the internationalisation of human rights. After the adoption of the UDHR many international covenants and conventions have appeared on the international scene. The best-known are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian historian, says that human rights have become the major article of faith of a secular culture (1999:12).

So, what is the crisis? The crisis I am referring to has two interrelated aspects, a political aspect and a moral one (Ignatieff 1999:12-13).

As for the political aspect, the end of the Cold War has made it possible for the international community to intervene if states commit serious violations of human rights. These interventions may be welcomed as a way of protecting the human dignity of those whose rights have been violated. But, these interventions also entail problematic aspects. Firstly, interventions have given rise to tensions between state sovereignty and the international enforcement of human rights. Until recently, states could agree to conform with human rights norms but need have no fear of being compelled by force to live up to them. Granted, under human rights instruments states were supposed to submit reports on their human rights record and on the implementation of human rights in their territories, and sometimes even judicial or quasi-judicial organs could criticize states that had failed to abide with human rights norms. However, compliance was not enforced. It was possible in such circumstances for the idea of the sovereignty of states to hold out. But, as interventions have become a real possibility and have actually been undertaken, the conflict between state sovereignty and international enforcement of human rights comes fiercely to the fore. Secondly, interventions have not always been successful and sometimes the remedy appears to be worse than the disease. Furthermore, the international community, commanded by only a few states, has not been particularly consistent in its intervention-policy. The interests of the leading states have played an important part in the decisions whether or not to intervene (Forsythe 2000: 58). Human rights and interventions to enforce compliance with human rights could have been used by some states to advance their own interests. The British political theorist, Peter Jones, says that it is difficult not to be cynical about the way human rights are sometimes used in contemporary foreign policy. The invocation of human rights by governments is often Atoo convenient and too selective to carry conviction.@ (Jones 1994: 2). Similar opinions are held by others, for instance by Nasr Abu Zayd, an Egyptian Islamist and philologist, currently living in the Netherlands. He says that human rights have become an instrument in foreign policy, and admits that sometimes this may be to the advantage of people who suffer from violations of human rights. However, he continues to say that human rights are often being politically manipulated by the powers of the North as a means of exercising domination over the Third World countries. The use of human rights as a means of advancing the interests of the states concerned influences the second, the moral aspect of the crisis in human rights.

This aspect regards the legitimacy of human rights, the capacity to generate universal acceptance of human rights as justified guidelines for interpersonal human behaviour and social policy. This aspect will be my main concern. Is the legitimacy of human rights under threat, and if so, how can we maintain or achieve legitimacy?

I will argue below that the current situation suggests an affirmative answer to the question of whether the legitimacy of human rights is under threat. Since the eleventh of September 2001 especially, human rights and other 'Western' attainments, such as democracy, would seem to be on bad terms with other cultures, such as Islam. This could lead us to think that we should abandon the idea of universal human rights. I will argue, instead, that human rights rest on a generally accepted moral foundation, which may be called humanistic. I will argue that it is not valid to equate this humanism that is the basis of human rights with humanism as a life stance. The question that then arises whether the public humanism that underlies human rights can function as a generally accepted moral foundation. I will claim that this is possible only if this public humanism can be regarded as an 'overlapping consensus': a morality that is shared by different life stances. This will come about only if we embark on a dialogue aimed at attuning life stances and public humanism to one another, which also requires humanists to engage in a process of self-reflection.

The Legitimacy of Human Rights

It is generally assumed that human rights are the product of Western modernity and it is a historical fact that the UDHR was adopted in 1948 by the then only 56, mainly Northern/Western, member-states, whereas nowadays the number of member-states has increased to about 190. However, the assumption that human rights are originally a product of Western modernity need not imply that they are purely Western. Abu Zayd has argued that Western modernity is built upon "modernities" that existed earlier and elsewhere. Western modernity and its product human rights are the heritage of 'the history of human struggle, since Spartacus in Rome untill Nelson Mandela in South Africa, against all kinds of human injustice', to quote Abu Zayd (1998b: par.5). This should be borne in mind when it is said that human rights are the product of Western modernity. It can be added that the fact that the rights of the UDHR were drafted and adopted in the forties of the last century by mainly Northern/Western states does not mean that they could not have become universally accepted since. There have been world conferences on human rights (in Teheran 1968, in Vienna 1993, and also the Women's Conference in Beijing, 1995) where also the newly emerged states endorsed the human rights of the UDHR and of the subsequent documents. Besides, most countries have formally signed and ratified most human rights documents. Consequently, the final declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna says that the universality of human rights is beyond question. So, it may be concluded: all is well that ends well.
It should be noted though that the formal acceptance of human rights shows some defects. There is no formal consensus in all its particulars. No human rights document has been accepted by all nations and many documents have been accepted with, sometimes very substantial, reservations (McKay 1979: 67). Besides, the formal acceptance is partly to be seen merely as lip-service to human rights. It looks like this is also the view of Samuel Huntington. His ideas have been quoted often, in particular after the eleventh of September 2001. He argues that the world can be divided up currently into nine civilizations, i.e. the Western, Latin-American, African, Islamic, Chinese, Hindu-, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese civilization. These civilizations have their own particular ideas about the meaning of life, family relations, honour, friendship, interpersonal relations, the relationships between the individual and community, and the arrangements of society. Human rights are a Western invention. They are alien to non-Western civilizations. The more Western countries press non-Western countries to accept so-called universal human rights the more the latter will resist the human rights idea and resort to their own traditional ideas (2001: 197).

Maybe I was a little previous in saying that all is well that ends well. Maybe the universality of human right is not beyond question. It cannot be denied that at least some people or countries do not accept human rights from the heart. Some Third World countries remain suspicious of human rights, as has been shown by Abu Zayd. They regard human rights as a Western product, and as they have suffered and still suffer from the imperial and colonial exploitation of their resources, they regard human rights as an instrument used by the West to advance its economic interests. Other Third World countries accept only some human rights from their heart. In particular, they accept socio-economic rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to housing and the right to health care, but they are reluctant to accept civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of life stance and the right to freedom of association.

Therefore, despite the formal general acceptance, there still is no general inner acceptance of human rights which is a flaw in the moral legitimacy of human rights. Does this mean that we should abandon the idea of universal human rights?

Secular Humanist Underpinnings of Human Rights

For all people to be motivated to whole-heartedly accept international human rights these rights have to be justifiable on the basis of moral principles that can be accepted by all. The question is, what is the moral foundation of human rights and is there a consensus on it? Many writers have stated that human rights are founded on a secular humanism (Ignatieff 1999: 13, 44). So, secular humanism appears to be the foundation of human rights. The next question is then: Can this humanism attract general consensus? If we consult a few Islamic writers it apparently can not.

Mohammed Arkoune, an Algerian philosopher and expert on Arab language and literature, mentions that many Muslims are reluctant to accept human rights because the secular humanism of human rights is not bound up with their religion. Secular humanism negates the long history of human rights in Islam. He mentions that many Muslims argue that all notions that are concerned with human rights were already to be found in the Koran and in the society founded by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina and Mecca. By taking the way of secular humanism the West negated the historical links with Islam. This has diminished the willingness of Muslims to accept international human rights from their heart and has prompted them to advocate instead human rights that are sanctioned by God.

Riffat Hassan, a Pakistan born expert on Religious Studies and Feminist Studies, finds it easy to understand that the United Nations in 1948 wanted to distance itself from any sort of identification with religion, which throughout history has contributed significantly to divisiveness and strife in the world. She finds it harder to understand that the United Nations has continued to refuse to deal with the fact that for millions of human beings whose lives are rooted in belief rather that unbelief, human rights become meaningful only when they are placed within the framework of their belief.

Abdullahi An-na'im, a Sudanese expert on human rights, expresses a view similar to that of Riffat Hassan. He adds, that secularism will have difficulty in providing a generally accepted moral foundation of human rights (2000). An-na'im is of the opinion that secular humanism by rejecting any specific moral vision for social policy, will be forfeiting its capability to justify human rights, even to non-believers (2000). He argues that such a secularism will fail to motivate people to accept human rights as legitimate claims. Besides it will be unable to deal with religiously founded objections to human rights, for instance those that oppose equality between men and women. An answer to these kinds of objections cannot leave the religious rationale of discrimination out of consideration. Such a secular humanism is by definition unable to address these issues at the appropriate, i.e. the moral and spiritual level.

The remarks of the aforementioned writers show that for secular humanism to be a moral foundation of human rights, it cannot be mere unbelief, irreligion, mere atheism and itself devoid of values ( Ignatieff 1999: 45,47; An-na`im 2000). A secular humanism that holds aloof itself from morality cannot offer a moral justification, much less a justification that can count on a general consensus. However, it must be stressed that the humanism of human rights is not such an empty secularism, a secularism devoid of values.

The Values of Human Rights: A Paradox

It has to admitted that human rights documents lack any explicit reference to particular moral views. But, this does not mean that moral values are totally excluded from human rights. In my view, the UDHR and the subsequent documents, show a morality and even a minimalist anthropology. They contain moral values, i.e. values about how people should behave, and a view of man, i.e. a conception of the characteristics of human beings. The nature of this morality and anthropology will be influenced by the claim that human rights are acceptable to people of different life stances. Hence, the morality should be general and the anthropology should be restricted to the necessary anthropological presuppositions of this morality. I hope this will become clear.

The most important element of this anthropology is that human beings are regarded as persons. The true identity of human beings lies in their being a person (Donnelly 1982: 305; Wal 1989: 202). Human beings are subjects, beings that have self-awareness, feelings of joy, sorrow, distress, pride, beings that intend to have something or to be somebody, and that endowed with moral and mental capacities, try to realize their goals (Wal 1988: 98). More can be said about human beings. They are vulnerable, susceptible to suffering and being confronted with threats to their existence. They are social, humans among humans. They are open, which is to say that they are not totally determined by their instincts and accordingly they are obliged to make choices and to set their own course. As an answer to their vulnerability, sociality and openness people need well-being, participation and freedom. They need basic well-being, in other words they need to be free from suffering and threats to their existence. They need participation, in other words they need to be recognised as a fellow human being, as someone who counts. They need freedom, in other words they need to be enabled to live their lives as they see fit. Well-being, participation and freedom are valuable for human beings in their own right but they are also valuable in that they are necessary conditions for achieving purposes. When people lack minimal material resources, when they are excluded from their social environment and are not recognized as fellow humans, when they are prevented from living their own lives, they cannot survive as human persons.

These are the main elements of the minimalist anthropology of human rights: human beings are regarded as persons, that are vulnerable, social and open, and that need well-being, participation and freedom, as goods that are valuable in their own right and in that they are necessary conditions for achieving goals and purposes. This anthropology is though not explicitly mentioned in human rights documents, but it can be reconstructed from the documents, as has been shown by many scholars (Gewirth 1996: 16, 81; Orwin & Pangle 1984: 3; Waldron 1995: 98).

This minimalist anthropology forms the presuppositions of the morality of human rights. Human rights set out to guarantee and to improve freedom, participation and well-being, as these are necessary generic goods, goods which all people need to live as human persons (Gewirth 1998: 107). Freedom, well-being and participation may be called the key substantial values of human rights, values that indicate what goods should be provided for. Apart from these substantial values, the human rights idea contains other values, that are related not to the content of human rights, but to the structure of the human rights idea. Firstly, individuality. To prevent any misunderstandings I would like to stress that this does not mean that human beings are regarded as atoms, as unencumbered selves that are detached from their social and cultural context and that have an identity independent of their social commitments and cultural bonds (Mulhal & Swift 1992: 45). The principle of individuality is perfectly compatible with the view that human beings are social beings rooted in a socio-cultural context. It says that individuals should take moral priority over collectivities, to that extent that individuals should not be sacrificed to enhance the welfare of the collectivity. The very fact that the overall good of a society could be enhanced is no reason to sacrifice an individual. In the end, the aim of social policy should be the individual, the good and happiness of individuals. A second structural value is equality. This holds that it is not a few individuals that should be the subject of concern, but that every human being is entitled to freedom, participation and well-being and to the human rights that seek to guarantee these substantial values. A third structural value is responsibility. This stresses that human beings are endowed with reason and moral sense and it requires that people are regarded and treated as responsible persons. As rightholders they are not just objects of concern but subjects who are owed the duties required by the rights.

It will have become clear that a minimalist anthropology and morality underlie human rights. We can agree with An-na'im's warning that a secular humanism that is mere unbelief cannot provide a generally acceptable moral foundation of human rights, because it would be aloof from morality and ultimate questions. The humanism of human rights, however, is not an empty secularism, not a secularism that limits itself to a denial of the existence of God, it appears to contain a morality and even a minimalist anthropology. After having thus made clear that the humanism of human rights is not mere unbelief and having described it as a morality and an anthropology, the question then rises: Can thís humanism offer a generally acceptable moral justification of the international human rights?

In trying to answer this question we may run against a paradox. If this humanism of human rights has a morality and a minimalist anthropology, it resembles the humanism we are familiar with, the humanism of the national and international humanist movements, which is considered to be a life-stance or an outlook on life. This humanism is often presented as an alternative to religions and sometimes even as being on bad terms with them. The Minimum Statement on Humanism of the International and Ethical Union says that 'Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives. It stands for the building of a more humane society through an ethic based on human and other natural values in the spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities. It is not theistic, and it does not accept supernatural views of reality'.

The IHEU web-site also says: 'Humanism seeks to be a modern, cosmopolitan and democratic alternative to traditional religion and to authoritarian and other oppressive social attitudes'. But, how can humanism be a particular life-stance, even non-theistic and an alternative to religion, and at the same time a scheme of values underlying human rights that pretend to be capable of acceptance by people of many and varied religions or life-stances? One cannot expect people of other life-stances or religions to accept humanism as a life stance. The answer to this paradox is, in my view, that the humanism of the human rights idea is different from the humanism as a life-stance. I will call the former public humanism and the latter existential humanism. I use the term public humanism because the humanism of human rights concerns human relations in organised society. The term existential humanism refers to human existence in general and not only to human relations in organised society. The best-known manifestation of existential humanism is the humanism of the humanist organisations, of the IHEU and the national humanist movements. I will use the term ideological humanism to refer to this manifestation of existential humanism.
To avoid misunderstandings one could also use the term humanitarianism in stead of public humanism and reserve the name humanism for humanism as a life stance. However, two reasons can be advanced to maintain the name humanism for this public humanism. Firstly the name humanism is in fact used to refer to the underlying morality of human rights. Secondly, human rights are aimed at the protection of human dignity, which justifies the use of the word humanism.

Ideological Humanism and Public Humanism

As a life-stance, ideological humanism tries to give an answer to the question of the meaning of life, which contains two more specific questions, i.e. the question how life, the world and human beings are to be understood, and the question how life is to be lived. Correspondingly, humanism as a life-stance has two dimensions, which are the answers to these specific questions. It has an ontological dimension that says how life, man and the world are to be understood. (The view of man may be seen as distinct from the view of life and the world and called an anthropological dimension. Here it is seen as part of the ontological dimension.) Ideological humanism also has an ethical dimension saying how life is to be lived (Brümmer 1989: 140). To the ontological dimension belong statements such as "there is not a supernatural world above the natural world", or "human life is the result of evolution", or statements like "God does not exist", or "it is not possible to say whether or not God exists", statements such as "human beings are natural beings and subjected to the laws of nature", "human beings have the capacity to reason and to choose", etc. On the other hand, the idea that it is worthwhile to reflect on your actions, the idea that it is good not to submit to dogmas or not to yield unconditionally to authorities, the idea that it is good to make your own choices, that it is good to be a responsible person, deal with how life is to be lived.
The public humanism of human rights does not seek to give an answer to the question of the meaning of life. It does not want to get on existential grounds. It instead seeks to give an answer to the question as to what generally acceptable guidelines for interpersonal behaviour in organised society people could develop and formulate. Accordingly, it does not present an explicit ontological dimension, although it contains, as we have seen, a thin anthropology. It does though present an ethical dimension (the values of human rights, which I have outlined above), but this morality is of a different nature from the ethical dimension of ideological humanism. This ethical dimension is not a morality of the good life, like the ethical dimension of ideological humanism, but a morality of a just society (Fuller 1969: 5). It does offer guidelines, not for living a good life but for interpersonal behaviour in organised society.

It may be noted that drawing a distinction between a morality of a good life and a morality of a just society does not amount to artificially separating what naturally belong together. People happen to pose these different questions. One may pose the question of the meaning of life without explicitly posing the question of a just society. And one may pose the question of a just society and try to answer it, without at the same time explicitly posing and answering the question of the meaning of life. There is a fundamental difference between the morality of a life stance and a morality of a just society, although there will often be connections, as we shall see later. To elucidate the difference between the morality of ideological humanism and that of public humanism, I will briefly outline the contents of freedom, participation and well-being (the substantial values of public humanism) as opposed to their ideological counterparts, autonomy, communality, and pleasure/self-fulfilment.

An important value of ideological humanism is autonomy. Autonomy, being a principle of a morality of the good life, says that people should try to be the author of their lives, that they should reflect on their acts and their convictions, and should live according to what they themselves think is valuable. This autonomy is not to be equated with the principle of freedom of public humanism. Being a principle of public humanism, freedom cannot entail a precept of living a good life. It says only that society should be arranged so as to enable people to live as they think fit. This entails that people who adhere to the ideological principle of autonomy should be enabled to live as they think fit. But, it also implies that people that do not value the principle of autonomy should be enabled to live their own lives. Even people, who do not attach importance to the idea of being the author of one´s life, but who conform to traditions or submit to authorities and who obviously feel comfortable that way, should have the right to live their lives in the way they do.

Participation, as a value of human rights, is not a principle of a good life. Ideological humanism contains a principle that has some similarities with participation, as it is concerned with the social character of human beings. I will call it the principle of communality. This principle holds that human flourishing is flourishing in togetherness. Realizing oneself as a human being is realizing oneself as a fellow human being. Friendship with others, love, relationships, care and commitment can contribute to a meaningful life (Van Praag 1978: 90). The principle of participation as a principle of public humanism does not want to offer an ideal of a good life. It does not say that people should try to live in community with others and that relationships may contribute to a meaningful life. It only demands that human beings are treated as beings that count, that may have a place in organized society, and that may take part in the system of shaping society.

Also well-being, as an underlying principle of human rights, is not a principle of a good life, although ideological humanism is concerned with human well-being too. But this concern is different from the way in which public humanism is concerned with well-being. One may interpret the concern of ideological humanism with human well-being as a precept that people should seek after pleasure, or that they should try to enjoy the spiritual and material pleasures of life. Or it may be taken as saying that people should try to develop themselves and that self-fulfilment will lead to well-being. Whatever the exact meaning of the concern with well-being of ideological humanism, it will have the character of a guideline for living a good life. The principle of well-being of public humanism is different from these precepts of pleasure or self-fulfilment. It says only that people should have a minimum level of material resources and that they should be free from starvation and socio-economic misery, whether or not they strive for enjoyment or self-realization.

Not only the substantial values of public humanism will be different from their counterparts of ideological humanism, but also the meaning of the structural values of human rights, individuality, equality and responsibility, will be slightly different from their counterparts of ideological humanism. I will not elaborate on this differences. I hope the foregoing will suffice to show that public humanism is different from ideological humanism, because they are answers to different questions. But it shows more. It also shows that public humanism is not even a public morality that directly flows from humanism as a life-stance. Indeed, there may even be some tension between public humanism and ideological humanism. For instance, an ideological humanist may be of the view that the idea that God has created the world is objectionable and that religious schools that teach creationism should not be eligible for public subsidies. An adherent of public humanism on the contrary could argue that even creationists should be enabled to live as they think fit and are as entitled to public subsidies as evolutionists. Likewise, an adherent of ideological humanism could value the principle of autonomy to such an extent that he or she believes that only people who live autonomously are entitled to freedom, are entitled to live their lives as they think fit, and that others should 'convert' to autonomy (Barry 1995: 131). This not just hypothetical because there are ideological humanists who do not stop asking people whether their way of life is really their own individual choice and who do not accept that people live their lives out of respect for their tradition or from a sense of duty towards their community.

General or Inclusive Humanism

The foregoing illustrates that ideological humanism exhibits the characteristics of a life stance. The contents of this life-stance though have been outlined only very briefly. It will be obvious that more can be said about ideological humanism. I will not do so because it is outside the scope of this article. My aim was to show that public humanism is essentially different from ideological humanism. My aim was not to outline ideological humanism. However, I would like to add one important point. Some people have a life stance that may be called humanist, although it differs from ideological humanism. In fact, the ideological humanism of the humanist movement is just one manifestation of existential humanism.

Ideological humanism, as presented by international and national humanist movements, is a life-stance in its own right. It upholds what may be called a thick, comprehensive, conception of the good life. It has been moulded in organizational structures and its contents have been substantially elaborated by many thinkers on humanism. Ideological humanism is rather easily to define by virtue of its organizations and explicit theories, although this humanism too will vary from person to person. But, humanism as a life stance may have other, less pronounced, forms. Views of life that embody the notion that the world is always as it is interpreted by human beings, that every statement about the world implies human involvement, that consequently we should refrain from presenting our views as dogmas, that we are able to give meaning to our lives, and that we are able to live a dignified life and create a humane world, can be called humanist. It will be obvious that in fact humanism as a life stance will have many manifestations and that the "thickness" of humanism will vary from person to person.

The less pronounced manifestations of humanism as a life stance are difficult to categorize because they lack structures and explicit theories. Often a "thin"-humanism does not appear as a separate life stance but will often be found in combination with some other life stance, even with religions. May be one would rather say that such a thin humanism is not a life stance by itself but a way of dealing with a life stance. People may have a humanist way of dealing with their Catholic or Islamic life stance as contrasted with a dogmatic way. Such a thin humanism may be called general or inclusive humanism.

This general humanism shares with ideological humanism an orientation to the meaning of life. It is a manifestation of humanism as a life stance, a manifestation of existential humanism. It seeks to offer a view of life, man and the world and it wants to offer guidelines for living a good life. But, it differs from ideological humanism in its relationship to religions. Whereas ideological humanism distances itself from religions, general or inclusive humanism seeks to be compatible with religions, although it objects to fundamentalism. It does not object that people believe in God or the supernatural, but it opposes, like ideological humanism, a belief in absolute, unchangeable dogmas. It advocates criticism, dialogue and tolerance in religious affairs. So, within this perspective of inclusive humanism it makes perfectly sense to speak of humanist Christians, or humanist Muslims, or, conversely, of Christian humanists or Islamic humanists. This humanism does not exclude religious people and has a more general character than ideological humanism (Derkx & Mooren 1996: 68).

General humanism shares its general character with public humanism. It does not, however, fall in with public humanism. It does not focus on the question of what generally acceptable principles for interpersonal behaviour in organized society people could frame. It still is directed at questions of the meaning of life, it still is a life-stance, although not as thick as ideological humanism. Of course, general humanism will have social aspects, as will ideological humanism. Both manifestations of humanism as a life stance will contain ideas about interpersonal behaviour. But, these ideas will result from the conception of the good life. Ideas about living a good life will imply ideas about living a good life as a fellow human being. Public humanism, by contrast, is social in three respects: it seeks to offer guidelines for interpersonal behaviour; it seeks to present guidelines that are acceptable to all; in order to frame these guidelines it takes the perspective of people in general (What guidelines for interpersonal behaviour that are acceptable to all can we frame?).

General humanism may, though, come close to public humanism. The starting-points of general and public humanism remain different: the former starting from the question of the meaning of life, the latter from the question of a just society. As a consequence, general humanism will, like ideological humanism, provide a view of life and man, and a morality of a good life, and public humanism will contain a view of a just society. But, the answer to the question of the meaning of life will entail certain principles of a just society. And, the answer to the question of a just society will presuppose a minimalist anthropology and ontology. And, since general humanism seeks to be general, its answer to the question of the meaning of life, especially where it entails principles of a just society, could bring it near to public humanism. How near will depend on the specific contents of the two humanisms for individual persons.

My main point is that there is a difference between a view of a good life and a view of a just society. This applies in any case to the relationship between ideological humanism and public humanism. It applies, perhaps with less force, to the relationship between general humanism and public humanism. In what follows, I will concentrate on the former relationship. The important consequence of the differences between public humanism and ideological humanism is that someone can be an adherent of public humanism without being an ideological humanist, and vice versa. To put it differently, a Muslim, Protestant or Catholic who cannot be regarded as an ideological humanist may be an advocate of public humanism. As a public morality, public humanism does not directly flow from humanism as a life stance.

An Overlapping Consensus

After having oulined the difference between ideological humanism and public humanism, I will reiterate the question: can public humanism function as a generally accepted moral foundation? To be a moral foundation, the humanism underlying human rights should not be mere unbelief. As has been shown, the humanism of human rights is not mere unbelief, it is a morality. To be general, it should not be a particular life-stance. It has also appeared that the humanism of human rights is not ideological humanism, it is not a life stance, it is a public morality which means that this humanism can overcome the paradox that has been raised. The question now is, whether this public morality is acceptable. To be acceptable and accepted, it should not be in conflict with people's various life stances. On the contrary, it should be connected with these life-stances.

Consequently, to be a generally acceptable moral foundation public humanism must be an 'overlapping consensus' to use an expression of John Rawls. This is a morality that is not a morality of a particular life-stance, but that on the other hand is not detached from life-stances, in other words it should be a morality that is shared by various life-stances (1985: 240). Human rights are universally legitimate if they are founded on such an overlapping consensus. This overlapping consensus may still be called secular if this is taken to mean a commitment to safeguarding the pluralism of political community, to organising our disagreements, as Abu Zayd says. But it is not a secularism that is mere unbelief. Religions and other life-stances are not totally disregarded by it, but recognised as the source of the values, as different ways to a common goal (1999).

Have we reached a situation in which public humanism functions as an overlapping consensus and legitimizes human rights? Not yet (An-na'im 2001). One may think that Huntington is right in saying that non-Western civilizations are reluctant to accept human rights and their underlying values. As for the Muslim world, Nasr Abu Zayd, Riffat Hassan and Abdullahi An-na'im admit that some Muslim countries are inimical to human rights. Human rights and their underlying values appear to be in conflict with Islam. One should, however, not equate Islam with the Muslim world, so Abu Zayd says (1998a). Although, undeniably, some of the political manifestations of Islam are in conflict with human rights and its underlying values, it cannot be said that the Koran and the authentic tradition of the Prophet or Islamic thought are inimical to human rights and the values of public humanism. Abu Zayd, A-na'im and Hassan endorse many of the values of public humanism, which Abu Zayd refers to as principles of humanity. For instance, Abu Zayd declares that the basic and essential teaching of Islam is equality of all humans regardless of race, colour, religion or gender (Abu Zayd 1998a). This view is shared by An-na'im who argues that the justifying principles of human rights can be found in different religious traditions, including Islam. Riffat Hassan even calls the Koran the Magna Carta of human rights (1995; 1996).

In order to achieve an overlapping consensus a dialogue is needed. Abu Zayd, An-na'im and Riffat Hassan emphasize the importance of such a discourse (Hassan 1995; An-Na'im 2001). The dialogue is to be continued until a reconciliation is brought about between the three partners of a tripartite relationship, i.e. human rights, the underlying values (public humanism or the principles of humanity) and life-stances. In other words the dialogue aims at reaching, what may be called, a reflective equilibrium, to use another of John Rawls' expressions (Rawls 1976: 48; An-Na'im 2001). None of the partners should keep out of harm's way. The dialogue may lead to a change in interpretations of human rights, a change in the meaning of public humanism and a change in life-stances. The dialogue that is required has two components. The first is internal. Every belief should permanently reflect on its premisses and ask itself whether it may have fallen into idolatry, into the worshiping of false gods, or into credulity (Ignatieff 1999: 51). The second component is inter-cultural and cross-cultural. In that dialogue we should exchange our views on a dignified life and try to agree on common values that contribute to a dignified life consistent with the principles of our life-stances, and we should also explore how far the individual human rights go towards realizing these values.

A Dialogue

Abu Zayd has developed a socio-historical methodology to stimulate a discourse within the Islamic world. He argues that a religion passes through a long development of interpretations and reinterpretations that are embedded in a cultural and socio-political background (1998b). The original texts of Islam are messages from God through the prophet Mohammed. But a message is a communicative relationship between a sender and a receiver with the help of language. That message can only be understood by the receiver if it fits into the contextual reality and culture, in other words into the socio-political reality in which the receiver lives and into the culture that is embodied in the language being used. For the message to be understood by people of today it must be recoded to make it fit in with the context of the current receiver (1997).
An-na'im also wants to initiate an internal discourse within the Islamic world, in particular on sharia, its normative system (2001). He advocates what he refers to as an anthropological approach. The law (the sharia) is of divine provenance, but every effort to understand the message of God involves human understanding, comprehension, judgement, imagination, experience and behaviour, all of which are influenced by socio-historic contexts. The sharia has to be reinterpreted to realize the requirements of the Koran. An anthropological approach is consistent with the terms of the Koran many of whose verses invites individuals and the community to reflect and to reason independently.

Riffat Hassan also advocates an internal dialogue, in which people can rethink their views and may see that often authorities have adjusted theological views to their liking. Besides she advocates an intercultural dialogue arguing that God has decreed dialogue for us to discover our common roots and to journey together towards our common goal (1995).

These efforts of Abu Zayd, An-na'im and Riffat Hassan should be welcomed and it is to be hoped that the proposed dialogue within Islam will demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and human rights. But can the West and can (ideological) humanists wait until the dialogue within Islam (and other civilizations) bears fruits?

Westerners may be inclined to regard themselves as being strongly in favour of human rights. But, are they? And among the Westerners (ideological) humanists may regard themselves as the natural born advocates and defenders of human rights. But, are they?

(I will set aside the point that it is hardly impossible to speak of Westerners or humanists as a homogeneous group.) It may be interesting to know that in the eyes of some Muslims, Westerners are less in favour of human rights than they themselves are inclined to think (Abu Zayd 1999). For instance, Abu Zayd is of the opinion that political Europe and the United States 'are still living in the age of the white man's superiority', and that the issue of human rights is always used to serve the political and the economic interests of the West (1998b). An-na'im introduces the notion of 'human rights dependency': whereas Northern countries pay little heed about the view of the South on their (i.e. Northern) human rights record, the Southern countries are sensitive to Northern pressure to comply with human rights norms, because of the political and economic dependencies of the South on the North.
A recurrent point of reproach by Southerners is Western reluctance to take economic, social and cultural human rights seriously. Westerners speak highly of civil freedoms, but freedom is worthless without means of subsistence.

These views of non-Westerners may be an impetus for Westerners to hold a dialogue in which human rights, their underlying values and life stances are reflected on. The dialogue should also imply an effort to engage in an empathic understanding of the ideas of others. If Westerners are prepared to do so, they may understand that many Muslims' rejection of modernity and its product human rights is due in part to the imposition of modernity on Muslim countries during the era of colonisation. Abu Zayd and Mohammed Arkoune show that in the eyes of many Muslims modernity is the face of the coloniser and the master, the enemy and the teacher. To regain a true independence Muslim countries has striven for an identity that differs from a Western one (Arkoune 1995: 453-457).

Westerners and Muslims should also take into consideration their biographical history. History shows, that we, since the birth of Islam in the seventh century, have lived with the idea that the people next door were strange people. Christians on the one hand and Muslims on the other have become inimical towards each other in a process in which theology has been mingled with political power, as Arkoune has said (1995: 453-457). Theological views were developed to gain political power that was used in turn to support theological views. We depicted each other as political and religious enemies. According to Abu Zayd Muslims still are the enemy of the west. Inimical feelings towards Islam have revived in the West, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union.

An Invitation to Humanists too

The start of an internal dialogue of Muslims and other non-Westerners may be welcomed, as may be an internal dialogue of Westerners. Also an intercultural dialogue may be welcomed, but what about humanists? (I'm referring here to ideological humanists). Can they wait until these dialogues bear fruits? Are not they self-evident defenders of human rights?

I think that humanism, as other beliefs, should reflect on its premisses and should ask itself whether it is in line with the public humanism of human rights.

Do humanists perhaps pay more attention to human's ability to choose than to his and her vulnerability and sociality? Do humanists treat the values of public humanism equally, or do they consider freedom to be a value more important than well-being and participation? Is it possible that the emphasis that humanists have put on autonomy and freedom have contributed to the importance that is attached to civil and political rights and to a neglect of economic, social and cultural rights? Maybe this have led to the result that hardly anybody speaks of a violation of human rights when many people die of hunger, when millions of children are exploited in bonded labour, when millions live a life devoid of prospects because they have been out of work for years, when millions cannot afford to buy medicines against AIDS because prices are held high at the insistence of shareholders, or when millions of handicapped people are excluded from a dignified life because society makes no allowances for them; and that on the other hand it is spoken of a violation of human rights when people are monitored with police cameras in shopping centres, or when someone, accused of rape, is forced to undergo a DNA test, which involves nothing more than an involuntary donation of a tiny amount of saliva. Has humanism contributed to that?

And what have humanists brought about by introducing and strengthening humanism as a life-stance and by organizing and institutionalizing it, as they have done during the last fifty years? We have made humanism a life-stance by itself. But, ideological humanism may have been an impediment to the universal acceptance of public humanism. True believers may be suspicious of public humanism and of human rights based on it, wrongly thinking that it follows from ideological humanism which as a life-stance may be in conflict with their own life-stance or religion. This may be a reason to avoid using the term humanism for the underlying morality of human rights and a reason to move to the word humanitarianism.

If we want human rights to be universally legitimate Westerners and humanists will also have to accept the invitation of Abu Zayd and An=na-im to become involved in an internal and external dialogue. We will not attain a universal legitimacy of human rights by the formal adoption of the documents that specify them. That may make them legal, but not legitimate. To be universally legitimate, human rights will have to be founded on values that are acceptable to people of many and varied life-stances. The proposed dialogue could bring human rights, the underlying values and life-stances into line.

However, all this presupposes the willingness of people to embark upon a process aimed at agreeing on values that are acceptable to all, which implies a willingness to accept each other as equal partners and a willingness to accept that the envisaged common public morality will be different from the morality of one=s life-stance (Barry 1995: 168.) It may be doubted whether fundamentalists will show this willingness. But, this willingness is also absent when we merely ask or even expect other people to share our values and our conceptions and interpretation of human rights. Riffat Hassan mentions that efforts already have been made to hold a conversation between Christians, Jews and Muslims. As a result declarations on global ethics were presented. However, according to Riffat Hassan, these declarations were drafted by Westerners, based on Western ideas and then submitted to others. Such declarations can not be seen as the result of a real dialogue, in which people are invited to formulate for themselves the principles, in line with their religious beliefs, that are to be respected to realise a dignified life (1996).

The willingness to engage in a dialogue does not mean that the arranging of international society has to wait for a consensus to be achieved or that people in the meantime should refrain from expressing their views on particular practices. We cannot start from nowhere. We should not fall into the trap of endlessly delaying our value-judgements. We should be prepared to engage into a real dialogue aimed at bringing human rights, public humanism and life-stances into line, which also means that we should take care to constantly review our insights. But, at the same time we should make a strong stand for human dignity as we now see it, we should denounce torture and suppression by dictatorships, exploitation of women and children, the policies of fundamentalist regimes on women and religious freedom, the death sentence on the Pakistani humanist Dr. Shaikh for blasphemy, the policy of the US on the death penalty or on socio-economic rights, and discriminatory practices and practices of exclusion and marginalization in various countries. After all, human dignity is at stake.

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