SPEECH BY ROB BUITENWEG
Noordwijkerhout, 4 July 2002

Ladies and gentlemen,
Fifty years ago, hope pervaded the world. Hope that after the horrible events of the Second World War, a new international order could be established that would promote a humane world. Since that date the world indeed has changed, but not unambiguously for the better. It looks like fundamentalism is gaining ground, terror, wars, genocide and armed conflicts strike the world, the gap between the rich and poor is widening, many people die from hunger, millions of children and women are exploited and bereft of hope for a dignified life. What can the IHEU offer this world in the twenty-first century?

In my view organized humanism is confronted with a twofold task: We should continue making a stand against fundamentalist and intolerant religious beliefs. We should unmask the irrational illusions of dogmatic religions. We should continue presenting and developing humanism as a life-stance in its own right and as an alternative to fundamentalist religions. And we should go on dedicating ourselves to the defense and promotion of humanism and the rights of humanists. During the last fifty years we have fought and won many battles in this field. Still much more needs to be done.

However, we should not limit our critical attention to the illusions, irrationalism and intolerance of dogmatic and fundamentalist religions, but we should also free human beings from other dehumanizing ideologies and circumstances. The domain of humanism is human dignity. Our aim is human development, the expansion of human freedom and well-being. Our ideal is a humane world, a cosmopolitan citizenship with universal human rights. This all implies that we are not only concerned about the rights of humanists. All human rights, civil and political rights, as well as socio-economic rights of all human beings, should be the focus of our concern. But, what could be our special contribution in the field of human rights, compared to human rights organizations? I will try to make that clear.

There is a crisis in human rights. At first sight this would seem to be an unsustainable statement. After all, the second half of the last century saw the impressing development of international human rights. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, has been followed by many international declarations and conventions appearing on the international scene.

So, what is the crisis? The crisis I am referring to regards the lack of real acceptance of human rights. Are human rights really and whole-heartedly accepted by all and regarded as universal standards for human behaviour?

It can be doubted. I'm not thinking of the alleged Western origin of human rights. Many do argue that human rights in general and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular have arisen from Western culture. That is also the opinion of An-na'im. We need, however, not be disturbed by that. I'm prepared to take the Western origin of human rights to be a historical fact. But, this possible Western origin does not mean that human rights could not have become universally accepted since. Also Coca Cola is a Western invention, but it has spread all over the world and has become universal. What about human rights? Have they spread all over the world and does everyone now likes human rights, even if they had originated from the West? Formally, yes. Formally they have been endorsed by all countries. The Final Declaration of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 says: 'the universality of human rights is beyond question'. However, we should not 'play ostrich', and stick our heads into the sand. The point is that despite this formal, general endorsement, human rights are not whole-heartedly, generally supported. The formal endorsement is, at least partly, to be seen as paying lip-service to human rights. Not everyone really likes human rights or all human rights.

Samuel Huntington, in his famous Clash of Civilizations, like An-na'im and others, argues that human rights have arisen from the West. But he goes further than An-na'im and others. He says that human rights still are alien to non-Western civilizations. Non-Westerners don't like human rights. I think, Huntington is wrong in assuming that non-Western countries are by their very nature inimical to human rights. I think he is right in saying that currently many countries still are suspicious of human rights. Many Third World countries that have suffered from colonial exploitation, think that Western countries politically manipulate human rights in order to continue exercising domination over non-Western countries.

A lack of a sincere and whole-hearted commitment to human rights is, among others, shown in the politics of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military interventions to stop violations of human rights. These interventions are executed in the name of human rights, but apparently the interests of the leading states have played an important part in the decisions whether or not to intervene. This has called into question the sincerity of the interveners and has not motivated others to take human rights seriously. A lack of sincere and whole-hearted commitment to human rights also appears from the reluctance of many countries to recognize the jurisdiction of the newly established International Criminal Court.

Also problematic is that some countries only accept some human rights or a particular category of human rights from their heart and that they are reluctant or unwilling to accept other human rights. For instance, many Western countries embrace freedom rights (like the right to freedom of religion or to freedom of association) but some neglect socio-economic rights (like the right to adequate housing, or to health care) and neglect the right to development or the rights of indigenous peoples. On the other hand many non-Western countries lay the emphasis on socio-economic rights, but are less in favour of freedom rights. We can conclude that obviously not all countries whole-heartedly support all human rights.

So, this is the current situation to which we should not shut our eyes. Even if we take human rights to be formally, generally endorsed, there still is no general inner acceptance of human rights. The question we have to answer then is, how can we achieve a situation in which all people whole-heartedly accept human rights?

For people to be motivated to whole-heartedly accept international human rights, they must see that these rights really matter. In other words, they must see that these rights are founded on moral values that they regard as of paramount importance. And that means that these values should be in line with their fundamental beliefs. If human rights were founded on values that are in conflict with their fundamental beliefs, people would not really accept human rights, would they? So, the question then is: What moral foundation do human rights have, and are these values by all regarded as of paramount importance, i.e. in line with their fundamental beliefs?
And it is here that humanism is coming in, because it is generally assumed that human rights are founded on a secular humanism. Secular humanism is the foundation of human rights. Is that a moral foundation that is regarded by all as of paramount importance?

According to some, it can even be doubted whether that secular humanism is moral at all. My highly esteemed colleague An-na'im argues that a secularism that rejects any specific moral vision for social policy will fail to motivate people to accept human rights as legitimate claims. Such a secularism is forfeiting its capability to justify human rights, even to non believers.
An-na'im and others are right when saying that a secularism that is a mere unbelief, a secularism that is merely a denial of god, cannot offer a moral justification, much less a justification that can count on a general consensus. However, they are not right if they assume that the humanism of human rights is such an empty secularism, a secularism devoid of values.
It must be admitted that the UDHR and subsequent documents lack any explicit reference to particular views of life. But this does not mean that human rights lack a moral vision. Moral values are implicitly present in human rights. Let me briefly outline the implicit moral vision of human rights.

In human rights documents, people appear as beings who have worth as persons, as intentional, striving subjects, beings who have self-awareness, beings who intend to have something or to be somebody. They are vulnerable and fragile, susceptible to suffering and confronted with threats to their existence. They are social, rooted in relationships and in family bonds, bound together by a common humanity. They are open, destined to lay out their own course and to shape their own lives. They are responsible and reasonable, i.e. endowed with reason, conscience, mental and moral capacities. They are different and diverse, with regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, but they are equal in human dignity.

These human beings should be enabled to lead a dignified life. Ultimately, every individual should be the subject of concern. They should not be sacrificed to enhance the welfare of the collectivity, of the state, the party or the church. They should be free from suffering and threats to their existence; they should be free from humiliation and recognized as fellow human beings, as someone who counts; they should be free to live their lives as they think fit. They should act towards one another in a spirit of solidarity, they should treat one another as responsible persons and enable one another to lead a dignified life. In particular, those who are disadvantaged should be taken care of.

This is but a rough and brief sketch of the humanist view of man and the morality underlying human rights. Is this an empty humanism? Is this a humanism devoid of moral values? This humanism is not merely unbelief. It is a belief, it is a belief in human dignity, it is a belief in human beings, a belief that despite the atrocities that people commit towards one another, despite the misery they inflict upon one another, despite our failures and mistakes, human beings still are capable of creating a humane world and a dignified life.

My point of departure was that for people to be motivated to accept human rights whole-heartedly, they must see that these rights are founded on important moral values, i.e. values that they can accept as in line with their fundamental beliefs. Now we have seen that this foundation is secular humanism, and that this certainly is a moral foundation. And, I'm sure, we, humanists, can accept this foundation as in agreement with our fundamental beliefs. But can other people accept secular humanism as in agreement with their fundamental beliefs? And can secular humanism motivate other people to accept human rights as legitimate claims? Here, a basic question arises: Can we expect people of other life-stances or religions to accept the humanism of human rights, whereas at the same time maintaining that humanism is an alternative life-stance to religion? I think, we can.

To see why and to what extent we can do this, it is important to be aware that the humanist tree has two branches: let me call them an existential branch and a socio-ethical branch. They have grown from the same roots, human dignity and respect for humanity, they still are congenial, but nevertheless they have developed as distinguishable.

The existential branch of humanism focuses on the question of the meaning of life. It says how life, the world and human beings are to be understood, and it says how life can be meaningful. This branch contains a morality of a good and meaningful life, a morality of human flourishing, an art of living. It is this branch of humanism that has developed as a real life-stance, an alternative to religion. It is secular, meaning that our view of reality is not inspired by a supernatural belief, but that it is a naturalistic view that is committed to the use of critical reason and scientific methods of inquiry in seeking answers to important human questions.

The socio-ethical branch of humanism has a slightly different concern. It is less concerned about questions regarding the existence of God or a life in the here-after, regarding creationism, evolutionism. It is not so much a morality of a good life as a morality of a humane society. It tries to give an answer to the question of how people of varied and different life-stances can enable one another to lead a dignified life. This socio-ethical humanism can be found in classical Stoa, the early writings of Marx, in the early writings of Kenneth Kaunda, in the views of Tagore and Roy, in the words of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela, and of course in the IHEU. This branch of humanism is the moral foundation of human rights. It is still secular, but not implying that people have a naturalistic view of reality, but indicating that the state and socio-political arrangements should be neutral with regard to life-stances.

I repeat, these branches of humanism are congenial but nevertheless distinguishable. And it is only by being aware of this distinction that we can expect people of other life-stances or religions to accept the humanism of human rights, whereas at the same time maintaining that humanism is an alternative life-stance to religion. We do not want others to accept the existential branch of humanism. We do not want them to renounce their faith. We do accept that they belief in God, that they believe that God has created the world, that they want to obey God's laws, that they believe in a life in the hereafter.

But, we do hope that they are prepared to accept the values of the socio-ethical branch of the humanist tree, the humanism that underlies human rights. If they do, they will be motivated to whole-heartedly accept human rights. The question then is, how can we achieve a situation that people see the paramount importance of these values and regard them as in agreement with their fundamental beliefs?

To achieve this it is important to initiate and carry on a dialogue about those underlying values, a dialogue with Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and other religious people. The aim of that dialogue will be to reach common ground, coming from diverse and different routes. We, humanists, should take the lead in initiating this debate and in reaching universal agreement on these values. We have a special responsibility we cannot neglect. After all, it is humanist values that underlie human rights. It is humanist values that are object of debate. And we are the heirs and guardians, even the gardeners of the tree and both its branches. This is our special contribution compared to human rights organizations.

An-na'im and others have intimated that they are in favour of such a dialogue. He has proposed that Islam engages in an internal and cross-cultural dialogue. Those proposals should be welcomed. But if it is to be a real dialogue, we may expect participants to reflect on their religious premises and ask themselves whether they may have been fallen into idolatry or credulity. If it is to be a real dialogue, we may expect people to be prepared to accept that they cannot impose their religious values on others; we may expect them to be prepared to accept that the common values to be agreed upon, although in line with their religions, will be different from their religious values. I'm not sure that all religious participants really will show this willingness.

But, what about us? Can we wait until others have embraced the socio-ethical humanism of human rights? If we want to be sincere and honest, if we want to be taken seriously as initiators or participants in the dialogue, we also should be prepared to reflect on our existential values. Also, we should ask whether these values could have been an impediment to the universal acceptance of the socio-ethical humanist values underlying human rights. It looks unlikely that they could, but it is not impossible.

Take, for instance, our values of autonomy and freedom. If you look at the concept of the IHEU Amsterdam Declaration you see how important freedom and autonomy are. And rightly so. But could we have put too much emphasis on these values, maybe to the detriment of other values underlying human rights, like well-being, solidarity, human development, health? Could that emphasis on autonomy and freedom have contributed to freedom rights being highly valued and socio-economic rights being neglected? With the result that hardly nobody speaks of a violation of human rights when many people die from hunger - when millions of children are exploited in bonded labour - when millions live a life without prospects, because they have been out of work for years - when millions cannot afford to buy expensive medicines against AIDS, because the shareholders of the businesses want the prices to be high, but that on the other hand it referred to as of a violation of human rights when people are being watched with police camera's in shopping centres, or when someone accused of rape is forced to allow that a little bit of spittle is taken out of his mouth. Has humanism contributed to that?

And take for instance our important value of equality. Could we have put too much emphasis on that, to the detriment of a value like diversity? With the result that the specific needs of women, minority groups, indigenous people have been overlooked? Whereas we should know that the opposite of equality is not diversity but inequality, and that the opposite of diversity is not equality but uniformity. So, respecting equality is completely compatible with celebrating diversity.

We should initiate a debate on human and humanist values, underlying human rights, with the aim of reaching common ground. We may expect participants, and also ourselves, to be prepared to engage in a real dialogue.

But the willingness to be a sincere participant in a dialogue does not mean that the arranging of international society has to wait for a consensus to be achieved or that people in the meantime should refrain from expressing their views on particular practices. We should not fall into the trap of endlessly delaying our value-judgements.

It is true, we should be prepared to carry on a real dialogue. But at the same time, and as part of that dialogue, we should strongly make a stand for human dignity as we now see it. We should denounce the policies of some countries on women and religious freedom, we should denounce the violation of people's self-determination in cases of euthanasia and abortion, we should denounce the conviction to death of Dr. Shaikh, and others who are accused of blasphemy, we should denounce the death penalty and other inhumane treatments, we should denounce the neglect of socio-economic rights by many Western countries and policies that continue poverty, we should denounce discriminatory practices, we should denounce the abuse and exploitation of children and women. After all, human dignity is at stake.

Thank you very much