The modern Iraqi state, established in 1921 under British mandate, and that gained independence and joined the League of Nations in 1932, was largely secular. The Monarchy (1921–1958) built its local power base on Sunni military officers and businessmen in the centre of the country, on powerful Shi'ite tribal Sheikhs and elders, and on Kurdish chieftains in the north.

The Shi'ite religious establishment in Najaf was dealt a powerful blow in 1923. After senior Hawza clerics issued fatwas to boycott the National Assembly elections, the government of PM Muhsin Al-Sa'doun reacted by arresting three senior clerics (Grand Ayatollahs Sayyed Abu Al-Hasan Al-Asfahani, Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Al-Na'eeni and Sheikh Mohammed Mahdi Al-Khalisi) and sending them into exile to Iran. One year later, King Faisal offered them amnesty and allowed them to return to Iraq provided they did not interfere in politics.

The clerics reluctantly agreed. From then on the Shi'ite "Marji'iya" adopted a quietist attitude to Iraqi politics until the mid-sixties when Ayatollah Khomeini arrived on the scene in Najaf.

The first Iraqi constitution in 1924 borrowed heavily from western secular constitutions, but King Faisal I in order to support his tumultuous power base and to control the fragmented country, issued (with British support) the Tribal Disputes Regulations granting supreme power to tribal Sheikhs over their local areas including judicial powers and tax collection responsibilities. Reactionary tribal and religious courts became widespread in rural areas of Iraq, and civil laws on personal status and family affairs were only valid in urban centres.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi educated class, known as efendiyya, continued to challenge popular superstitious religious beliefs and dogmas which were predominant in Iraqi society. This divide had started during the 19th century Ottoman reforms of Midhat Pasha (governor of Iraq) when modern western ideas and innovation began to pour into Iraq. The clergy prohibited everything that came from outside including telegraphy, press, newspapers, typewriters, phonographs (unless they were used to recite the Quran), etc. Secular hospitals and schools were opened in several Iraqi cities (only religious and military schools had existed previously) and were

also widely condemned by the clergy.

At first, many Iraqis heeded the clerics’ warnings, but in time, after they saw young men who had been sent to schools by their parents growing up to become respectable and well-groomed efendiyya and governmental employees, they started sending their children en masse to these schools – followed soon by the cleric’s own children. An even greater uproar followed the opening of the first school for girls in Baghdad. One Baghdadi who was about to enrol his daughter in the new school was warned by a cleric of the eternal torture he would face in the afterlife as a result of this action.

The Baghdadi responded to the cleric: "Look here. We believed you in the past and listened to your sermons and did not send our sons to schools. Years went by and we realised that our sons grew up to work as janitors for your sons in governmental departments. I will never allow my daughters to become maids to yours."

There was even fiercer opposition against Arab liberal writers whose audacious works appeared in several scientific journals and papers in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon. One journal that was published in Egypt from the late 19th century until Nasser's coup in 1952, Al-Muqtataf (the Excerpts), dealt with religious and philosophical subjects that one can only dream about reprinting in today's Arab world. A similar paper in Iraq was called Tanweer Al-Afkar (Enlightening Thoughts).

There was a popular saying at the time; "Egypt writes, Lebanon prints, and Iraq reads." Arab publishing firms, at the time, were dominated by liberals and secularists, unlike today where the state and the religious establishments have reversed this trend and freely censor anything they wish.

The efendiyya in Iraq introduced and promoted many secular and scientific theories that were shocking to the clergy – such as Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection, Einstein's theories of relativity and quantum physics, Marxist dialectical and historical materialism, Freudian psychology, and socialist political theories. The clerics were awed and unable to draw on their dusty, centuries-old theological volumes and trusty Aristotelian logic to debate the new ideas. One such cleric wrote a whole book called "The Decisive Sword Against Those Who Claim Rain Is From Steam". Another cleric wrote a book in which he argued that there is no way the earth can revolve around the sun since in Surat Al-Kahaf:86, the holy Quran explicitly provided 'scientific' proof that the sun sets in a black muddy spring; "Till, when he [Dhu Al-Qarnain (Alexander the great)] reached the setting-place of the Sun, he found it setting into a black muddy spring...".

But the progressive secular tide was stronger than the clerics, whose voices were soon drowned out and their influence restricted to the illiterate and impoverished rural areas.

Secularism continued to dominate the political Iraqi scene following the fall of the monarchy in 1958, and the Ba'ath regime that assumed power after the 1968 coup openly rejected (in theory) religious sectarianism, racism and tribalism. However, the seventies witnessed the awakening of religious Shia aspirations in the south to impose an Islamic theocracy in Iraq based on the doctrine of Wilayet Al-Faqih (the rule of the jurisprudent) held by Ayatollah Khomeini. One of his disciples in Iraq, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir Al-Sadr, who had been active politically since the early sixties when he found the Da'wa party, challenged the Ba'ath government and issued a fatwa prohibiting joining secular 'infidel' parties such as the Ba'ath and the Communist party.

Sadr and his ideology turned into a more serious threat after the Islamic revolution in Iran led by Ayatolla Khomeini. He was arrested and summarily executed by the regime shortly before the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980–1988). Saddam's regime grew more wary of the political and intellectual activities of the Iraqi Shia, openly persecuted them, and banned their religious ceremonies and publications. Gradually, the Ba'ath adopted an increasing sectarian policy against other Iraqi religious groups. Following the 1991 Gulf War, and during the difficult years of UN-imposed sanctions, Saddam implemented a 'Faithfulness Campaign' in which religion became state-sanctioned. Civil personal status laws were modified according to Islamic law, 'honour killings' now went unpunished by the law 'to protect the deep-rooted moralities of our society', blasphemy laws were introduced, secular publications were limited, and religion was heavily incorporated into school textbooks and social life. People who were observed violating the Ramadan fasting periods were imprisoned or beaten, and alleged prostitutes were beheaded in public.

After the American invasion, and during the lawless phase that followed, religious establishments (or at least people acting on their behalf) in the south reportedly ransacked rations depots and relocated food and medicine to mosques and husseiniyas. Clerics distributed these goods to local populations, assigned duties and organised daily affairs giving an impression of authority, especially at a time when Iraqis were in need of "any" leadership to help control the chaos that erupted all over the country.

As the power-crazed clerics realised their position, they started issuing all kinds of fatwas and statements.

Former opposition Islamic parties and groups (Islamic party, Da'wa, SCIRI, Hizbollah) and a score of new ones (Al-Fadheela, Intiqam Allah, Tha'r Allah, Qawa'id Al-Islam, Al-'Amal Al-Islami), almost exclusively Shi'ite, came to dominate Iraqi postwar politics. For one reason or another, they were rewarded with positions of authority by Bremer's administration. After the ministries were divided among them (the spoils of war), each party-ministry started to reward its adherents and followers, and a few ministries (Oil, Health, and Education in particular) openly adopted sectarian and partisan policies in appointing their employees.

Government departments, schools and colleges have since been filled with religious symbols and posters of Shi'ite saints and Ayatollahs.

On the streets, intellectuals and professionals were threatened, intimidated into leaving the country and targeted for assassination in a blatant attempt to wipe out the former secular face of the country. Secular political parties, to this day, are often targeted. The Iraqi Communist party in Basrah was raided and ransacked by the police (loyal to the Islamic Da'wa party) for no reason. The offices of the Workers Communist party in Nasiriya were set on fire and several members kidnapped and tortured. INC and INA parties in Amara, Basrah and Nasiriya are also regularly attacked. A women’s rights organisation office in Basrah was taken over by Tha'r Allah and the women threatened with death if they returned.

Liquor stores, social clubs, music shops, DVD rental vendors, barbers and hairdressers have all been subject to criticism, threats and armed reprisals. Columnists, reporters and writers (including yours truly) who dare to criticise are regularly threatened. Reactionary hardliners in the interim government have recently been lobbying to separate boys and girls in all educational institutions (including colleges), segregation that was carried out in primary schools in the south shortly after the war.

Experience has shown that after each concession made to the religious hardliners, they soon return with further demands. Today they want to separate boys from girls in schools and colleges, tomorrow they will demand the same applied to government departments, in a few days they will demand mandatory veiling, and in the future they will no doubt demand that women once again be stoned for adultery.

Iraqis today, more than ever, are in terrible need of secular voices to confront the rising fanaticism in Iraqi society. Most Iraqis have turned to the religious parties and demagogic groups because of the lack of organised alternatives. Mosques and Husseiniyas provide charity for the impoverished, militias provide jobs for the unemployed and promise paradise if they take over the country. They keep repeating the mantra "Islam is the solution" and point out former Iraqi governments as an indication of the failure of secularism.

Unless we secularists can work together to ensure our voices reach the confused Iraqi public, unless we speak out against fanatics, whether they be in the street, in the government, or in the 'resistance', we are condemned to a fate even worse than that of Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Afghanistan under the Taliban.